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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARLEN E. DOUGLAS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JACK I. GIGANDET, CASE NO. 8876 Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
MRS. PHYLLIS GIGANDET, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the verdict of the jury and 
the judgment of the lowGr court rendered on the 26th 
day of February, 1957 in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendant Jack I. Gigandet on his counter-
claim ''no cause of action'' and from the verdict of 
the jury and judgment of the lower court in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the Intervenor, Mrs. Phyllis 
Gigandet on her cross complaint ''no cause of action.'' 
Thereafter, appellants filed a motion for a new trial 
which motion was denied by the Court on or about the 
18th day of March, 1958. 
The facts are as follows: That on or about the 22nd 
day of June, 1956, on a highway known and designated as 
Highway No. 160 at a point approximately seven miles 
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North of Monticello, S.an Juan County, Utah a collision 
occurred between a 1954 Jeep Pickup truck being driven 
by the plaintiff-respondent and a 1952 Dodge Sedan 
being driven by the defendant-appellant Jack I. Gigandet. 
That the Intervenor-appellant, Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet, 
was .a passenger in the Dodge Sedan Automobile owned 
and operated by her husband. Plaintiff sued the defend-
ant Jack I. Gigandet to recover for damages to his truck. 
Mr. Gigandet filed his answer denying liability and 
counterclaiming for damages to his car and for personal 
injuries. Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet intervened and filed her 
cross-complaint for her damages from personal injuries. 
Appellants were residents of Toledo, Ohio, (Tr. 50) 
and were on a vacation trip en route to Salt Lake City 
and to Bryce, Zion .and Grand Canyon Parks. They 
spent the night in Cortez, Colorado and left there at 
approximately 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock the morning of the 
accident. The weather was clear and the road dry and 
visibility was good. They had left Toledo the previous 
Friday and had been on the road approximately eight 
days. That during this period of time )Irs. Gigandet 
had driven the car three or four hours (Tr. 51). 
That when appellant, Jack I Gigandet, first smY 
respondent's truck it was in the right hand lane in 
normal driving position ,and was being driven straight 
ahead down the road (Tr. 51 & 52) and was "'a couple 
of hundred feet'' ahead proceeding in the same direction, 
that, when appellant saw the road w.as clear for passing 
he pulled out into the passing lane when all of a sudden 
respondent turned. That there was nothing to indicate 
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respondent was going to turn, the road was clear, there 
was no indication of any traffic, or any side road or 
signs, or any slowing down on the respondents part. 
That he was about three car lengths from him when 
respondent suddenly turned left in front of him without 
any warning and he saw that he was going to hit the 
truck. He hit his brakes and wheeled back toward the 
right of the road so that he would not hit the cab. ( Tr. 
54). That prior to the accident he had been driving 
between 50 and 55 miles per hour and laid down skid 
marks from application of brakes (Tr. 57) and that the 
brakes were in good condition (Tr. 58) and that the 
speed limit was 60 miles per hour. 
Mrs. Gigandet testified that she did not observe any 
signal for a turn of plaintiff's-respondent's Truck. That 
she had not been driving that morning. That she had 
driven a car for at least twelve years prior to the time 
of the accident. 
The extent of the damage done to appellant's auto-
mobile and the extent of the personal injuries to appellant 
and to Intervenor are not material to a discussion or to 
the presentation of this appeal and hence .are omitted. 
ARG Ul\1EN~_, 
POINT 1. 
ERROR IN LAW OCCURRING AT THE TRIAL OF SAID 
CAUSE AND DULY EXCEPTED TO BY THE DEFENDANT 
AND THE INTERVENOR. 
POINT 2. 
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
AND AGAINST THE INTERVENOR BASED UPON THE 
FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT, JACK I. GIGANDET AND 
HIS WIFE, MRS. PHYLLIS GIGANDET WERE ENGAGED 
IN A JOINT VENTURE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
POINT 3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING INTERVENOR'S 
AND DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 
3, 5, and 11. 
POINT 5. 
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
THE VERDICTS AND THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED IN 
SAID CAUSE AND THAT SAID VERDI·CTS ARE AGAINST 
THE LAW. 
These points are so closely related, and the facts so 
interwoven that we shall consolidate them for purposes 
of this argument. 
There are two questions presented to the ·Court by 
this appeal. They are : 
(1) Was the defendant Jack I. Gigandet guilty of 
Contributory Negligence in the operation of his autmno-
bile at the time of the .accident and (2) whether his 
Contributory Negligence, if any, could be imputed to his 
wife who was riding as a passenger in his car. 
1. Was the defendant-appellant, Jack I. Gigandet 
guilty of contributory negligence~ 
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It is the contention of appellants that an emergency 
situation as to him was presented by the acts and conduct 
of the respondent. It must he borne in mind that the 
appellants were tourists in the area, and that they had 
no notice of any hazardous conditions existing at the 
point of the impact. They saw respondent approximately 
two hundred feet before the .accident and there was 
nothing about his driving to indicate that he intended to 
do anything but to continue along the main highway. 
Both the appellants were alert. There was nothing to 
distract them, driving conditions were excellent, and 
there appears to he no reason at all why they could not 
have seen a signal for a turn, if, in fact, such a signal 
had been given. 
Appellant, Jack I. Gigandet, testified as follows : 
'' Q. Now will you describe the, your activi-
ties and your movernents in your own car begin-
ning at the time when you first observed him ? 
A. Well, I saw him and I stayed in my lane 
for a few moments and then I saw the road was 
cle.ar and I pulled out into the passing lane, into 
the left hand lane, which I don't know that I got 
completely out in there when all of a sudden Mr. 
Douglas turned. There was nothing to indicate 
that he was going to turn and that was why I 
was passing him. rrhe ro,ad was clear' there was 
no indication of any traffic or any side road or 
any slowing down on his part. There was clear 
road ahead. 
Q. Did you observe any signs~ 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. State what happened, please~ 
A. Well, when I pulled out I got up to about 
three cars length from him. I was about three car 
lengths from him when all of a sudden he turned 
and he had been going slow. I noticed that from 
the top of the hill there that he didn't appear to 
be changing speed, or I saw no braking. No brake 
signal or anything like that, and when I got up 
there about three to, two and a half car lengths 
from him, something like that from him, all of a 
sudden he turned ieft in front of me without any 
warning. And I saw I was going to hit him. I hit 
my brakes and saw I was going to hit him and I 
wheeled back toward the right of the road so I 
would possibly not hit the cab that he was riding 
in. I didn't want to take the chance on hurting 
him." (Tr. 52, 53) 
Mrs. Gigandet was riding in the front seat and she 
testified as follows : 
"Q. Did you observe Plaintiff's truck at any 
ti1ne irnn1ediately prior to the accident~ 
A. The first time I noticed the truck was 
when we came over the hill and I noticed the 
truck at that time. 
Q. When you say over the hill, that was the 
hill approaching the accident~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Accident scene was it 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. State what, if anything, you observed 
your husband do as it refers to the moment, the 
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movement of your car immediately prior to the 
accident~ 
A. Well, we came down the hill and came up 
close behind Mr. Douglas' truck, and Jack was 
preparing to pass him and he started to pull out 
into the left hand lane and as he did that Mr. 
Douglas turned in front of us and at that time 
Jack turned back and he hit the back end of the 
truck. 
Q. Did you observe all these things~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now during that period of time did you 
observe any signal for a turn of the Plaintiff's 
truck~ 
A. I did not see any signal of any kind. 
Q. What was the visibility that day~ 
A. It was a very good day. Sun was shining, 
it was bright. 
Q. About what time of the day was this~ 
A. It was in the morning around 9 o'clock I 
believe. 
Q. Had you been driving the car that morn-
ing~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You do drive .an automobile do you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been driving~ 
A. My husband taught me when he was in 
the service, I imagine, Oh at least twelve years." 
(Tr. 74, 75) 
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Contrast this testimony with that of the respondent 
as it relates to his conduct before attempting to make 
·a left turn onto a side road. He stated that it was his 
intention to turn off on a side road that leads to Peters 
Point and that he looked in his mirror and saw no traffic, 
turned on his signal light and stepped on his brakes. With 
respect to his looking in the rear view mirror it is ap-
parent that if he in fact looked in the mirror he failed to 
see what he should have seen or that he failed to look 
immediately before he turned. With reference to his 
signal for a left turn we invite the Court's attention to 
his testimony on Cross examination with reference to a 
written statement he made .at the time of the accident. 
"Q. At the time you signed it do you know 
the contents of it~ 
A. Yes, sir. I remember it. 
Q. I want to call your attention to one state-
ment in there. And this is taken frmn this state-
ment that bears your signature. I was driving 
about ten to fifteen miles per hour and when I 
was about a hundred to a hundred fifty feet to 
the South of the road I was going to turn to, I 
was going to turn to the left. or \Y est on this old 
dirt road. I th~nk I turned on 1ny turn lights indi-
cating a left turn. However, I do not knozc for 
sure. I .always do turn on 1ny lights and I assume 
I did this time. (Tr. -17) (Italics ours) 
That respondent was negligent cannot now be ques-
tioned and the jury found hin1 so. It is the contention 
of appellants that the sole and proxi1nate cause of the 
accident was the negligence of respondent and that there 
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was no sufficient evidence upon which the jury was 
justified in finding appellant Jack I. Gigandet guilty of 
Contributory Negligence in causing the accident. 
With reference to the so called intersection at the 
point of collision, the Court gave Instruction No. 3 as 
follows: 
''You are instructed, Lady .and Gentlemen of 
the Jury, that as the Defendant approached the 
Jeep truck of the Plaintiff for passing he had a 
duty: 
(a) To use due care to observe that the 
Jeep truck of the Plaintiff was approaching a 
point at which a side road departed from the high-
way on which he was traveling; 
(b) If the circumstances were such that he 
observed, or in the exerise of reasonable and ordi-
nary care should have observed that there was a 
roadway intersecting with that on which he was 
driving, he had no right under the law to attempt 
a passing of the Plaintiff's Jeep truck at a point 
within one hundred feet of the point of departure 
or intersection of such road; 
(c) To keep such a lookout as .an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent driver of an automobile 
would keep under the same or similar circum-
stances to become aware of the location upon the 
highway of the Jeep truck of the Plaintiff and to 
become aware of any signals being given by the 
Plaintiff, if any, to indicate his intention to turn 
upon said road; 
(d) To proceed at no greater speed than 
was reasonable and safe, having due regard to the 
conditions as disclosed by the evidence and any 
actual or potential hazards, if any, then existing. 
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If the Defendant violated his duty in any one 
or more of the particulars stated .above, he would 
be guilty of negligence. 
If your minds are satisfied by a fair prepond-
erance of the evidence and that the Defendant, 
Jack I. Gigandet, was guilty of negligence in one 
or more of the particulars stated above and that 
such negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the collision, then you should find a verdict for 
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and assess 
his damages at the sum of $691.39.'' * * * (R. 81) 
(Italics ours) 
We submit that this instruction pl.aced a higher 
degree of duty upon appellant than was justified under 
the conditions. There was nothing to indicate to him that 
a private road or driveway intersected the main highway 
at that point. There was testimony that a stop sign was 
lying on the ground at that point. \Ye call attention to a 
few facts which should be considered by the Court. 
There is no evidence, whatsoever, that the so-called 
Peter Point Road was a '"street or highway" as defined 
by Section 41-6-7 U·CA 1953 and presumably falls within 
the definition of a "Private road or driveway". The evi-
dence was that it was a dirt road with gravel approach .. 
There was nothing to indicate to the public that said 
road was in existence. The take off point was between 
two white highway n1arkers. Grass and weeds hid any 
indication of said road on the .approach frmn the South. 
It appears frmn the testimony and exhibits that the road 
took off on an angle frmn the 1nain highway in a south-
westerly direction-opposite to the direction of appel-
lants direction of travel and that it dipped downward 
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from the main highway. There were no signs indicating 
a turn-off road, the center lines of the main highway were 
against passing to traffic proceeding south on the high· 
way but the broken line allowed passing to tr.affic pro-
ceeding north. There was testin10ny that a "stop sign" 
was down and lying off to the side of the highway. 
V.,T e respectfully call the court's attention to plain-
tiff's Exhibits B and C which are pictures of the general 
.area & which conclusively show that there was nothing 
to indicate to appellants that a side road existed. They 
also show the general grade and highway markings. We 
agree with appellant when in .answer to a question on 
cross-examination he stated as follows. 
'' Q. Did you ever see this intersecting road 
at all before the accident~ 
A. No. In fact, I was out just a week ago and 
I still didn't see the road until it was called to 
my attention." (Tr. 66, 67) 
It would appear that the lower court's instruction 
was based upon Sec. 41-6-58 UCA 1953 which is as fol-
lows: 
'' (a) No vehicle shall at any time be driven 
to the left side of the roadway under the following 
conditions: * * * * 
(2) When appro.aching within 100 feet of 
or traversing any intersection or railroad grade 
crossing." 
Section 41-6-59 UCA 1953 then provides ~s follows: 
''Signs indication passing zones-The state 
road commission is authorized to determine those 
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portions of any highway where overtaking and 
passing or driving to the left of the roadway 
would be especially hazardous and may by ap-
propriate signs or marks on the roadway indicate 
in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily ob-
servant person every driver of a vehicle shall 
obey the directions thereof.'' 
It would thus appear that before the court would be 
justified in giving such an instruction to the jury the 
evidence should either show that the intersection was 
plainly marked with appropriate signs or marks pursuent 
to law or that the facts should show that the intersection 
was such that a reasonable and prudent driYer using 
due care could have seen it. Such was not the case here. 
There is a serious question as to whether this ,,·as 
an interseetion as defined by law in any event. Between 
the cities of .Monticello and :Moab there are dozens of 
jeep trails, private cattle roads, hmnestead road:', nlining 
trails, and foot paths etc. which are not designated as 
public roads or maintained as such by the county or 
state. To hold that all these trails constitute intersections 
within the meaning of the law as set forth in the instruc-
tions of the lower court would place an undue burden 
on travel on the highways of the state and upon the 
drivers who use then1. 
We respectfully subn1it that the court erred in giving 
instruction No.3 ,and that the sole proxi1nate cause of the 
accident was the negligence of the respondent in creating 
an emergency situation. 
2. The Second question of this case is whether 
the contributory negligence, if any, could be i1nputed to 
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Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet who was riding as a passenger in 
the car. 
Appellants contend that the court erred in giving 
instruction Number 5 to the jury and in refusing to give 
defendant's requested instructions 3, 5, ·6, 7, & 8. 
Instruction Number 5 is as follows : 
"If you find that the Plaintiff was guilty of 
negligence which was a proximate cause of the 
collision and resulting damage, .and if you further 
find that the Defendant was guilty of contributory 
negligence which was also a proximate cause of 
the collision and resulting damage, then a further 
issue you must determine is whether the negli-
gence of the Defendant, Jack I. Gigandet, should 
be imputed to the Cross Complainant, Phyllis 
Gigandet, on the ground that they were engaged 
in a joint venture. In order to find that they were 
engaged in a joint venture, you must find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that they were en-
gaged in a joint enterprise for a common purpose 
.and that they were in joint or common possession 
and operation of the automobile in pursuance of 
such purpose with both having rights to be heard 
in its control and management. If you find such 
to be the fact, then they are both responsible for 
the operation of the automobile and the contribu-
tory negligence, if any, of the Defendant is im-
puted to the Cross Complainant, his wife, and she 
cannot recover. 
The mere fact that the Defendant and Cross 
Complainant are husband and wife standing .alone 
does not give rise to a presumption that they 
were engaged in a joint enterprise on the occasion 
of the collision. Nor does the fact that the Cross 
Complainant w.as not at the wheel of the auto-
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mobile at the time of the collision standing alone 
preclude a finding that she and her husband were 
engaged in a joint venture of the kind that makes 
his negligence imputable to her." 
The facts in this c.ase show that :Mr. Gigandet was the 
owner of the car involved in the accident and that he was 
driving his car at the time of the accident, that he was 
the breadwinner of the family, that he and his wife were 
on .a vacation trip to Salt Lake City and return home, 
that his wife had no income of her own, that !-Irs. Gigan-
det had driven approxilnately 4 hours during the trip 
in seven days of travel, that they proposed to return 
home by way of Highway 66 and by way of Dallas, Texas 
to visit Mrs. Gigandet's grandmother if the}'" had time, 
and that prior to the trip they had made plans for the 
trip. There were no other facts relating to control. 
A su1nm.ary of the law in Utah relating to this 
question is found in Fox vs. Lavender, ________________ Utah 
----------------, 56P ( 2) 1053. Justice 'y olfe speaking for the 
court stated in part as follows : 
"(1) ..... \\'here the owner drives a car him-
self, he has the direct control over its 1nechanism . 
. . . . . The test of whether one is the agent of the 
other depends on the right of control of one over 
the other ... ~' 
and then the court defined control as follows: 
''. . . . . Cmnplete control 1neans that the 
principal could dictate when the car was to be 
used, the destination or where it should go, the 
route it should take, and how it should be driven, 
whether slow or fast, behind or around traffic 
inside or outside the lane of traffic, etc. It is not 
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necessary that the principal should be physically 
able to so direct or control, but only that he has 
the right to. Such legal right of control arises out 
of the relationship of master and servant, where 
the servant is the operator_ of the car ...... " The 
The court then continued: 
the servant is the operator of the car " 
"(3) .. Joint Ownership-First, if any one, 
whether a husb.and or not, was solely the owner 
and was driving the car, there would be a very 
strong presumption that no one else had control 
over his actions. . . . . '' 
The fact that a husband and wife .are on a vacation 
trip together does not make it a "joint enterprise" or 
"common purpose". Nor does it meet the test of com-
munity of interest and obligations as will make the trip 
an integral part of such venture. The court then con-
cludes: 
•' (11) To sum up, when a sole owner is driv-
ing it is presumed, without more, that he is in 
control and has the complete right of control; 
* * *" 
As the court points out-.all the presmnptions are 
rebuttable by evidence. Another question here is whether 
the evidence presented was sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption. Appellants contend that it was not. 
We submit that the appellant-Intervenor, Mrs. 
Phyllis Gigandet was entitled to have the jury properly 
instructed by the court on the law as laid down by Fox 
vs. Lavender, Supra, and that in order for the jury to 
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fully comprehend the legal problems involved should 
have had control defined as therein defined. Such was 
the substance of the proposed instructions submitted to 
the court by appellants and refused by the court. \V e 
believe this refusal prejudiced the case for :\irs. Gigandet 
and reversible error was committed. 
CO~CLUSION 
We respectfully subn1it that the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment of the court as to both appellants 
should be set aside and the case re1nanded to the lower 
court for a new trial under appropriate instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.A.DA~1S, PETERSOX & 
ANDERSOX, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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